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INTRODUCTION
Climate change has been recognized as one of the foremost dangers facing the 
planet. The global warming through the climate change generates stress on 
basic cornerstones of human life viz., energy, food, habitations, human health, 
transportation, industrial production and water availability. 
Climate change thus cannot be seen as regional issue and transforms 
into a problem of global scale and enormity. The Earth’s atmosphere, as a 
natural resource, has historically been treated as a common but free-for-all 
property (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975). This free dumping backyard 
approach adopted in industrial and other economic activities have emitted 
an unprecedented amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the air. 
It has now been scientifically established that there exists boundaries for 
the carrying capacity of GHGs in earth’s atmosphere as a natural resource. 
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However, clearly ignoring these natural principles and boundaries of resource 
exploitation, the rapid industrialization of economic activity since 1750s has 
now emitted more GHGs than any time during the last millennium. The natural 
carrying capacity of atmosphere has clearly been encroached in this treatment 
of atmosphere as common and free dump. 
Earlier, in his landmark work, Boulding (1966) warned against the 
constraints to un-controlled industrialization and predicted that the improved 
lifestyles will ultimately face barriers of finite supplies and flows of materials 
and energy. Hotelling (1949) also reached a similar conclusion of limited 
carrying capacity of environment by applying the concept of optimal rate of 
natural resource productivity. Ironically, the warnings went ignored for several 
decades, till in earlier 1990’s the scientific body – IPCC, provided strong 
evidence on earth’s systems experiencing an unexpected rise in Global Mean 
Temperature (GMT) and causing a widespread climate change. The problem 
of climate change has thus presented the economists, a classic and most 
complex example of Hardin (1968)’s ‘tragedy of commons’. The atmosphere 
as a global public good and free natural resource has been severely abused by 
the human activities and ultimately resulted into an enormous social cost of 
global scale and threatened the inter-generational resource parity.
The subsequent economic researches on climate change has concluded 
that the current trajectory of emissions growth is not expected to peak in the 
near future without considering them as negative externalities and putting a 
‘per unit cost on emissions’. By applying sound economic theories, climate 
economists have come out with several economic and financial instruments to 
price these emission externalities. We will attempt to identify these economic 
costs and climate instruments in the following sections of the paper. We begin 
in next section by analyzing climate economics researches in areas of GHG 
emissions as externalities, and then identify the economic cost evaluation 
methods applied in cost benefit analysis in the section thereafter. Further, we 
present the economic cost factors of economic costs estimates of climate as 
has been provided in various past researches. Thereupon in the next section, 
we identify the economic instruments forwarded in the work of various 
economists and currently being widely applied in climate policy. In the second 
last section, we discuss the challenges and opportunities of climate change 
through lens of information provided on climate economics in the previous 
sections. In end, we conclude the major points of this research and suggest 
leads for future researchers.
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
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calculations of social and private marginal cost-benefits, design of viable mar-
ket-based instruments, evaluation among economic rationale of action versus 
action later (Nordhaus, 1991; 1994). We will discuss all these approaches over 
the coming section. 
EMISSIONS AS ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES 
Externalities are the unaccounted fallouts of an activity on parties external to 
it. As a result, the activity itself may turn up inefficient in resource usage and 
further the mitigation of fallouts can be a costly affair for the external parties. 
The concept of externality has been under academic scrutiny for around a 
hundred years. Externality was conceived as a negative or positive influence 
on a third party for which no price is attached in the decision of the users. 
In the earliest attempt, Pigou’s (1924) theory of welfare economics provided 
guidance on a market mechanism of pricing the negative externalities. The 
Pigouvian theory introduced the concept of identifying a marginal social cost 
of polluting emissions by any economic activity and argued to impose a tax of 
equivalent amount on the polluter. 
On similar terms, the environmental externalities especially pollution 
damage fit into this structure. Emissions are the negative effects on third party 
that create unaccounted costs and restrict the society as whole to achieve 
Pareto optimality from common resources. The growth in economic activity 
over last 150 years has been as a result of improvement in human capability 
to extract and consume more physical resources. The process however is not 
complete without generating externalities through physical transformation of 
matter and energy in gaseous emissions as waste. Waste gases are emitted 
as a result of chemical transformation of material and energy utilized in the 
activity. Emissions have long distance diffusive effects and carry intertemporal 
stay in atmosphere. This vintage and diffusive effect makes it more difficult to 
recapture and mitigate the effects of emissions on climate cycle. In materials 
balancing approach, Ayres and Kneese (1969) demonstrated that economic 
systems will continue to suffer from negative externalities if environmental 
systems have limited carrying capacity but economic activity caused waste is 
persistent in nature.   
Externality as a case of market failure and cost-benefit analysis
In cases where market-oriented economic systems fail to attach costs of exter-
nalities to the emitters, the costs of fallout will be borne by society and hence 
the concerned economic system would turn suboptimal in maximizing human 
well-being. After earlier years of neglect, the subsequent suggestions justi-
fied a public policy intervention to internalize this environmental externality, 
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wherein the third-party effects of emissions were required to be included in the 
internal costs of polluters. Several economic instruments and approaches have 
been forwarded by economists over the period of time to internalise the price 
of these negative externalities.
Taking cues from materials balance principle, Boulding (1966) justified 
that without technological intervention the carrying capacity of nature as 
reservoir of pollution would be limited. The welfare economics approach of 
resource endowments integrated externalities as crucial factors for deriving 
social optima and system efficiency. This acknowledgement of externalities 
further ensured the requirement of significant intervention for achieving 
optimality. One adopted change is the economic valuation of ecosystem 
as capital assets, which have led to innovative financial instruments and 
institutional arrangements (Daily, 2000).
Coase (1960), on the other hand, took social cost approach and produced 
two potential solutions for addressing externality problem – one targeted at 
the polluter and the other involving the sufferer. The distributional burdens of 
economic costs varied under these two approaches but it was argued that they 
carry equivalent efficiency weights. The first approach – polluter pays - argues 
to impose a charge - including an economic instrument such as taxes or a 
regulatory restriction, on the activity of polluter. The second solution - sufferer 
compensates - involves compensation of the polluter by the sufferer, to either 
stop / restrict the polluting activity or adopting costly measures to mitigate 
the pollution at source level. The sufferer compensates principle has specific 
relevance in cases wherein the polluter is a low-income agent and he has high 
switching costs in moving away from the activity. This free market approach 
requires government to serve as a facilitator for framing the rules for Coaseian 
bargains among polluter and sufferer.
Environmental impacts are generally accounted for in the statements 
of costs and benefits as part of investment appraisal process. The welfare 
economics approach for non-marginal changes arising from a project calls for 
their inclusion in a cost-benefit appraisal. However, environmental changes 
are usually construed as intangibles and accounting these non-marketed goods 
remained a challenge. Two popular theoretical approaches for estimation of 
non-marketed goods are revealed preference and stated preference methods. 
In a revealed preference approach individual’s price, preferences for a non-
marketed resource are revealed through transactions from other markets. 
Adopting a revealed preference approach, Hotelling (1949) forwarded travel 
cost method in context of calculating recreational values of public parks. 
Thereby, consumer surplus is estimated from the demand curve constructed 
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recreational value of the site can be captured by the time and travel costs 
incurred by people. The willingness to pay for accessing the site could be an 
estimation of the frequency of trips at differential costs. This willingness to pay 
for an environmental and intangible resource served as analogous to the price 
discovery and demand curve of a marketed good. Travel cost methods have 
since been used in various exhaustive ways for the valuation of intangibles 
(Ward and Beal, 2000). However, there are several challenges in efficacy of 
the travel cost methods such as evaluating a fair value for opportunity cost of 
time, the exclusion of non-users, quality of resource, and a statistical case of 
sampling bias.
The hedonic pricing method is also commonly applied to price an 
environmental service. Under it, the implicit value of an environmental 
activity is drawn through the association of its attributes to the observed prices 
of a differentiated market resource (Rosen, 1974). The most popular case is of 
emission’s effect on residential property prices (Ridker and Henning, 1967). 
Property prices are capital goods that derive their value among others from the 
rental charge originating from the asset. The rental charge in turn is dependent 
on other factor flows. Hence, in a regression known as hedonic price function, 
the environmental attributes, particularly the air quality can be taken as one of 
the independent variable contributing to the price of property. Thus knowing 
the value of property and implicit price for air quality can be drawn. 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS APPROACH FOR ASSESSING THE 
CLIMATE PROBLEM
Marginal Abatement Costs
Marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve is a measure for assessing the economic 
options for reducing emissions in a time bound frame. MAC can be defined 
as the cost of removing an additional unit of emissions from the atmosphere. 
Subsequently, the area under the MAC curve gives the sum of marginal costs 
known as total abatement cost. A MAC curve for CO2 emissions plots CO2 
prices for emission permits or the stipulated tax amount for CO2 taxes, on 
one axis, and on the other axis it plots the required emission reductions. As 
shown in figure 1 below, MAC plotting involves simulation runs of the models 
over various price-quantity scenarios. For multiple GHGs, MAC plotting is 
conducted through their benchmarking on global warming potential (GWP). 
MACs are generally applied as the primary tool to evaluate the benefits of 
abatement actions. MACs are also used to draw reduced-form inferences 
to examine the situations where solving complex models is comparatively 
difficult. Ellerman and Decaux (1998), for example, have applied MACs 
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to compare the abatement levels among different regions and the scope of 
emission trading therein. However, MAC outcomes remain challenged by their 
intertemporal stability as growth in technological opportunities and resources 
or variation in other related conditions may change the curves over time Morris 
et al (2008). Still, these are considered as valuable forecasting and cost-benefit 
tools for emissions trading and permit prices. A popular reference of marginal 
abatement cost curves for cost assessment of various measures is McKinsey 
MAC curves for forecasted GHG emission scenarios (McKinsey, 2009).
Figure 1: Marginal Abatement Cost Curve for Non-Annex 1 Countries 
(Source: The Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN), 2012)
Inter-generational socio-economic liability and resource equity
Amidst the debates, on one side there were suggestions including investing 
in improvement of socio-economic profiles of vulnerable regions, which will 
enable them to adapt to such changes themselves and will provide higher com-
parative intergenerational benefits (Cooper, 2000).  On the other hand, other 
economists preferred, under uncertainty, acting now in preservation of an envi-
ronmental asset is better given the seeming irreversibility of the costs attached. 
A conserved asset in the future will provide the choice on whether to preserve 
it further or not. Then only it will be assisted with better information available 
through the benefits from its existence. In an otherwise case, there is no chance 
of reconsideration when we have better information (Arrow and Fisher, 1974). 
Debated Discount Rates 
One of the most debated areas of climate economics has been the choice of 
discount rates for assessing the future climate changes cost-benefits (Nordhaus 
and Yang, 1996). The variation in discount rate automatically leads to different 
valuation of the expected future outcomes of climate related stress on World 
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economic choices also vary for different outcomes. On one hand, the positivist 
support application of market rates as the discount rate for future costs. On 
the other side, ethicists favor the intergenerational responsibility approach of 
maintaining the sustainability of global commons for future generations and 
hence lower discount rates. 
TOTAL ECONOMIC COSTS ESTIMATES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
Given the enormous scale of climate change challenge, it is believed that large-
scale investments are urgently required to build climate resilience, mitigate 
GHG emissions and support sustainable development across the countries 
(United Nations, 2010). Past researches have attempted to investigate the 
future economic costs of impending climate change and the amount of required 
investments for meeting the challenge. Figure 2 (Field et al., 2014) estimates 
the probable causality among likely temperature deviations and the loss of 
economic welfare.
Figure: 2 Estimates of the total economic impact of climate change at various 
levels (Source: Field et al (2014))
The precise estimates are still unclear on the actual costs suffered by global 
economies per year. A list of conservative estimates is depicted in the table 1. 
Such is the magnitude and scope of problem that a consensus on these numbers 
is still evolving, as new climate information is revealed and higher investment 
amounts are being proposed. The conservative estimates are projecting the 
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Agrawala & Fankhauser (2008) in their conclusion of a survey of cost 
estimates commented that the existing estimates of adaptation costs by various 
researches are preliminary and incomplete. They identify that studies need 
to broaden the geographical and sectoral scope and depth of various climate 
impacts and observe that there are still several relevant costs, which require 
to be incorporated within the existing and the extrapolated climate scenarios. 
Similarly, to address the overall challenges and preparing for a changing 
climate, researchers have mentioned amounts in the range of $500 billion (see 
figure 2).   
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
Economists have suggested control of externalities through putting price on 
externalities and adoption of economic instruments such as taxes, subsidies and 
marketable permits (Nordhaus and Yohe, 1983; Taschini, 2010). A comprehensive 
of list below in table 2 mentions the key economic instruments that have been 
introduced to tackle climate change. Broadly, they fall in the categories of fiscal 
or monetary (e.g. subsidies, price supports, and taxes), market based instruments 
(tradable licenses, permits or quotas), and financial instruments for risk hedging. 
Table 2: Economic Instruments for climate change (Source: Author’s own)
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Category Instrument Asset value impact (+ve/-ve) Industries
Taxes and fees Carbon Taxes -ve
GHG emission-intensive 
manufacturing industries; en-



















Soft loans +ve Low-carbon activities in all major sectors
Insurance
-ve ( Hedging 
costs)
all sectors; specially agricul-




The success of these instruments to control the climate change problem has 
been judged with mixed responses so far. For climate mitigation specifically, 
the approach adopted is to set price on per tonne emissions of GHGs in any 
activity and through this added cost, gradually incentivize users towards low-
emission activities. As restrictive fiscal and ‘market-based’ instruments of 
pricing – there is wider application of ‘Carbon Taxes’ and ‘Carbon Trading’. 
Similare to various other aspects of climate change, the merits and demerits 
of these two economic instruments have also been long under debate. ‘Carbon 
taxes’ are “price-based” market instruments that are expected to de-motivate 
emitters activity through the added cost of tax (Nordhaus, 2007). As carbon 
emissions vary by fuel (e.g. higher in coal with respect to natural gas), over 
the period of time, the added costs decrease the demand and consupmtion of 
higher emitting fuels. Taxes, simulatenously raise revenues for government 
to fund long-term emission control systems. Though, carbon tax spreads cost 
among a larger base and is easy to implement and monitor but it distributes the 
costs evenly among all the emitters inspite of credible differences in cost of 
mitgation for respective operations. In cumulative and system wide assessment, 
taxes lead to higher economic costs. Additionaly, covering all the GHGs within 
a single tax regime is difficult to operate. If taxes are not applied in all regions 
uniformly then competitiveness of industries suffer due to ‘carbon leakage’ i.e. 
production shifts to non-tax regimes due to cost-advantage.
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‘Carbon trading’, on the other hand, is a ‘quantity-based’ market approach 
whereby it provides flexibility in mitigating the targeted ‘quantity’ of 
emissions at least marginal costs. In the lon-term, the emissions doesn’t 
show a locational behavior and due to their mobility carry a global nature 
of impact. Carbon trading particularly operates on this concept and 
prescribes to reducing emissions on the behalf of high marginal cost entities 
in industiries and geogrpahies where the marginal cost of mitigation is 
minimum. The value and quanitifed amount of reduced emissions, in one 
entity on behalf of other, is transacted under a trading system of ‘cap-and-
trade’. Generally, the studies favor carbon trading systems over carbon taxes 
for their environmental performance, cost effectiveness, and distributional 
equity in costs among the players (Stavins, 2008). The international 
negotiations have also recognised the merit in the least marginal cost of 
abatement advantage provided under the trading systems and susbequently 
have adopted emissions trading as the choice policy tool for global treaties 
(Grubb, 2003). Kyoto Protocol (KP) is also designed on similar market-
based based principles and economic instruments. The emission trading 
systems under KP allows leveraging least cost advantages through three 
mechanisms – International Emission Trading (IET), Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation. The market-based economic 
approaches allow a system-wide reduction in total cost of compliance with 
emission reduction related targets. Since the adoption of KP in 2005, market 
participants and covered business entities have responded positively to 
these market based measures and substantial volume growth in emission 
reduction trade was observed during the first seven years (World Bank, 
2005 - 11) . In general, the trading systems that use permits have found 
more favor among both economists and policymakers (Montgomery, 1972; 
Tietenberg, 1985; Hahn and Hester, 1989; Stavins 1995; Ellerman, 2003; 
Stavins, 2008). However, the debate over  permits being a better measure 
than carbon taxes is still from over, in particular the economists have not 
been able to reach consensus on the comparative benefits over long term 
(Nordhaus, 2007; Cooper, 2008 ).
DISCUSSION – CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
INVESTORS
Amid the alternations in natural worldview and socio-economic conditions 
due to climate change the arising economic costs have a critical dimension 
and scope for investment community to adjust (for example, see in table 
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public insurance costs manifold, put the stakeholder value at risk for invested 
assets and raised long-term challenges to the profitability in mainstream 
asset classes and sectors. Insurers and reinsurance industry, for example 
are the frontline industries that would need to carry out readjustment to the 
assessment of event related risk measurement frameworks and valuation 
of claim sizes evolving therein. The unexpected nature and suddenness 
associated with natural shocks makes it even more difficult to account for 
the expected property damage size and costs precisely. 
Table 3: Driver, Effects, and Economic Risks and Opportunities of Climate 
Change (Source: Author’s own)
Driver Effect Economic Risks Opportunities
Climate Forc-
ings
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Role of private investments in climate adaptation and mitigation 
The cost of impact and the requirements for long-term investments also have 
varying degree of spread among the developing and developed economies. 
Developing countries, particularly the ones located in southern hemisphere 
are expected to be the worst sufferers and at the same time the high-growth 
economies among these are also likely to contribute Greenhouse Gases 
(GHGs) at an incremental rate. As highlighted in table 4 below, it is estimated 
that during the current decade, annually around $300 billion will be required 
by these countries for adaptation to climate change and mitigation of GHGs 
emission factors. In the subsequent decade, 2020-30, these investments will 
escalate to $500 billion. Simultaneously, along with the climate change 
control, the inter-connected theme of global energy supply is also investment 
intensive. To adapt under a 2 degree Celsius global warming scenario, IEA 
(2012) estimates that for low-carbon energy technologies alone a total of USD 
36 trillion dollar would be needed till 2050 - annually USD 500 billion till 
2020, and USD 1 trillion from 2020 till 2050.
At present, the developed countries have formally agreed to provide an 
annual assistance of $100 billion by 2020 towards addressing the adaptation 
and mitigation challenges among developing countries. Even then, the 
investment gap is of huge scale and enormity. Additionally, public finances 
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alleviation, health, education and livelihood sustenance related immediate 
matters of local concern. 
Table 4: Average Annual level of Investments required 
Author Publication year
Average Annual level of investments 
required (USD billion)
2010-2020 2030
International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis 2009 63-165 264
International Energy 
Agency 2008 565 565
McKinsey & Company 2009 300 563
Potsdam Institute for Cli-
mate Impact Research 2009  NA 384
Given the long-term and large size requirements of investments for tackling 
the climate change, a major policy puzzle has been how to arrange this finance? 
Two possible financing channels are a) the public funds that are raised through 
tax-receipts and other revenue collections by the national governments, and 
b) the private capital that comprises of the funds available with individual 
and institutional investors for capital appreciation and wealth creation. Among 
the two, the first resource, public funds are already constrained by various 
macroeconomic and poverty-alleviation related priorities. On the other hand 
the second pool of funds i.e., the private investment capital with its size and 
supply is also a possible alternative that can provide a sustainable resource of 
climate investment supply.
However, the climate negotiations within the context of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have been debating 
since early days and now have reached a stalemate, mainly over – who and why 
should fund these investments? Noticeably, at the Copenhagen conference of 
UN in 2009, developed countries agreed to contribute $100 billion per year by 
2020 to support climate adaptation and mitigation activities in the developing 
countries. On one end, $ 100 billion was a highly insufficient amount given 
the scale of climate problem, still, mobilizing even this large scale of annual 
investments from public funds looked very difficult. As is evidenced in the 
money contributed so far, it is clear that in this post financial-crises period when 
many governments are still struggling with fiscal and budgetary constraints, 
they will be unwilling to fulfill this commitment. One possible solution for 
this is to instead mobilize large private capital into the climate investments. 
However, this requires firstly, an extensive understanding of the private 
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investment landscape and its investment motivations, secondly, creating an 
enabling policy environment to facilitate private participation, and lastly, 
funding through incentives or investments, that gap which can make these 
investments attractive for private investors.  
CONCLUSION 
The research synthesizes the work in climate economics to discuss the 
economic perspective of climate change problem and how it may affect the 
investor behavior and their investment decisions. The emerging understanding 
on scale and scope of climate change problem is also supported by studies in 
climate economics where it has been declared a serious case of market failure 
and externality of uncontrolled industrial activity in the past few centuries. 
Marginal abatement costs and naturally endowed rights to intergenerational 
resource equity are the two main concepts that the economists have applied 
to examine the various dimensions of climate change and provide economic 
policy solutions to manage it. The direct annual economic cost estimates 
of the likely climate change vary to a great deal between the researchers 
and range between $5 billion and $110 billion. However, these forecasts are 
only in regard of the disaster related direct climate change costs. The studies 
predict as high as a five percent of annual global GDP income loss when 
indirect costs are also accounted under the total long term cost estimations. 
To address this problem, major categories of economic instruments 
suggested by the economists include subsidies, taxes and fees, tradable 
licenses, permits and quotes, and a list of financial instruments to hedge 
against the likely losses. Overall, the work presented in climate economics 
reveal that new kind of climate related economic costs would be incurred by 
various mainstream assets – particularly in the sectors of agriculture, energy, 
fisheries, forestry, health, manufacturing industries, transportation, tourism, 
and water. In addition, the estimates of annual investments required for 
addressing the climate change problem has been put at various levels of $500 
billion to over a $ 1 trillion in just the energy sector. In summary, the various 
economic costs and liable economic instruments will on one side stress the 
investment opportunities in several leading asset classes. On the other end, 
the huge amount of investments required and the incentivising economic 
instruments introduced by policymakers will also widen the investment 
universe of private investors.  
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